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Teaching with Ignatius: Justice in Pedagogical Practice
Jeffrey L. Wilson
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy
Loyola Marymount University
(jwilson@lmu.edu)
Abstract
The document Justice in the World, released in 1971 by the World Synod of Bishops, is an excellent basis for
thinking about pedagogical practice in Ignatian higher education as a constellation of acts of justice. I
describe here my personal experience (as an ambiguously Catholic faculty member) of teaching an upper
division ethics course in the core curriculum and contextualize it in terms both of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises
and the 1971 Synod document.
My title, “Teaching with Ignatius,” probably leads
you to expect that I will say something about how
I use Ignatius in my teaching, with suggestions as
to how you might use him in your teaching, as if
Ignatius were a tool or instrument one could apply
fruitfully to that difficult task of pedagogy we face.
But I mean something rather different by that
preposition, “with”. To clarify just what I mean
by it, I would ask you to consider the case of a
man or woman who enters one of the religious
orders founded or inspired by Ignatius. Such a
person gains the habit of thinking of himself or
herself as a companion of Jesus, as someone who
cultivates a sense of the presence of Jesus in his or
her life and, at the same time, a sense of his or her
presence to Jesus, as a part of his life. And such a
man or woman once immersed in Ignatian
spirituality might very well look back at the time
before this immersion and want to say that Jesus
had accompanied him or her along the way many
years before he or she became aware of this
companionship or became willing to cultivate it.
This person’s way of being “with Jesus” is, I think,
very much like my own experience of teaching
with Ignatius: there was a specific moment, on
joining the faculty of a University sponsored by
three Ignatian-inspired orders, that I began to
cultivate a companionship with Ignatius in
anything like a deliberate way, but doing so, I
quickly discovered that strong affinities existed
between Ignatius’ ways of teaching and of spiritual
direction and my own long before I had any
conception of who Ignatius might be or what he
might stand for. So when I write about teaching

with Ignatius, I do not mean teaching by means of
him, or using Ignatius in one’s teaching; rather, I
mean teaching alongside Ignatius, in a growing
companionship. What it means to me to write
about a companionship with Ignatius is that, even
though my undergraduate and graduate training
were not in the Ignatian tradition—far from it,
really—I nevertheless discover again and again
that there is a harmony between my fundamental
convictions about teaching, as well as my
methods, techniques, and habits of teaching, and
Ignatius’ general approach. In the eighteen years
since coming to an Ignatian university, I have
attended Western Conversations, joined the first
cohort of the Ignatian Colleagues Program, made
the Spiritual Exercises, and attended several years
of conferences of the AJCU Arts and Sciences
Deans. The companionship with Ignatius that I
write about here has continued to unfold more
and more through each of these interactions, and
my initial pedagogical affinities with Ignatius have
been reinforced and have extended into the ways I
proceed in an academic leadership role.
In order to express as concretely as possible what
I mean by these affinities, I will spend the greater
part of my paper outlining the course I have the
most experience teaching, and, not incidentally,
the course I consider perhaps closest to the core
of the mission of a Catholic university of any that
I know. The course is simply called “Ethics” and
represents a core requirement for upper-division
undergraduates in all our colleges. Students have
a choice—to my mind, only an apparent choice—
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between Ethics and Contemporary Moral
Problems, two courses that differ perhaps in
emphasis but seldom in their primary content and
never, in my observation, in their primary intent.
I teach my own sections of Ethics in such a way
that contemporary moral problems are very
present, at least weekly and sometimes daily, so
that the choice between one course title and the
other really does virtually constitute for me a
distinction without a difference. So I will tell you
a bit about my own ways of teaching this course
and the motivations behind them. It will come
out during this outlining that the question of justice
arises at multiple points for me as I teach the
course, which helps to relate the concerns of this
paper explicitly to the commitment that Ignatian
institutions of higher learning have to the
promotion of justice as a central aspect of the
service of faith.
I’ll spend most of this paper writing directly about
the Ethics course. If you know something about
Ignatian spirituality, you will have no difficulty, I
think, in identifying for yourself affinities between
my approach as I describe it and Ignatius’ views
and practices. But I will reserve a few pages at the
end of the paper to be more explicit about these
affinities. Eighteen years ago, I would have
included a caveat that I was a newcomer to the
Ignatian tradition, and that others could speak
more expertly about it. At this point in my career,
however, I would not describe myself as a guest in
the house of Ignatius so much as one of the hosts.
There are two facts of my religious background
that undoubtedly color my approach to questions
of pedagogy and spirituality. These two facts
bring it about that I do not quite swim in the
mainstream of Roman Catholic educators,
although I do believe that they and I swim in
tributaries of the same river. The first fact is that I
am an Episcopalian, which makes me a member
of what we fondly call “the worldwide Anglican
communion.” I suppose we call it this rather than
“worldwide Anglican Church” because it is not so
much a single organization with one hierarchical
authority as it is a federation, one might say, of
many different churches in increasingly profound
disagreement with one another, for example over
women in the priesthood and episcopacy, or
same-sex marriage and the ordination of

homosexual priests and bishops, who seldom
agree on much of anything, but all of whom stand
in a single tradition of liturgical practice and who
are, most significantly, in communion with one
another. Now, this fact complicates my approach
to spirituality and pedagogy more than you might
think. It is not simply a matter of belonging to a
different religious tradition and nevertheless
incorporating as much of the “Catholic” tradition
as my faith and conscience will allow into my
teaching. No, indeed, I am one of those
Anglicans who are quite convinced that we are
members of the Catholic Church, just not of its
specifically Roman branch. And I do not mean
(to be honest, I get tired of answering the question
whether I do mean) “catholic” with a small “c”,
just referring to the universal Christian Church
that would be thought of as including anyone who
identifies himself or herself as a Christian. No, I
mean Catholic with a big “C”, bigger, I would say,
than some Roman Catholics are accustomed to
writing, the Catholic Church whose priests and
bishops (many of whom now are women and
homosexual) stand in an unbroken succession
from Jesus through the Apostles. I mention this
conviction of mine not (at least, not only) to be
provocative, but to point out that it places me in
an awkward position of speaking, by my own
opinion, from inside the Catholic Church and
tradition, at the same time that many (but by no
means all) Roman Catholics would regard me as
standing outside that Church and tradition. The
awkwardness of this position sometimes leads to
absurd predicaments that would be comical if they
were not so discouraging, such as the conversation
I had with a student who insisted that however
much the Anglicans might believe in the
resurrection of the body, “real Catholics” believe
that only the soul survives death. What could I,
an “unreal” Catholic, answer to such a claim?
The second fact of my religious life that colors my
pedagogy is that I came to Catholicism rather late,
at the end of college, having been raised as a
fundamentalist Southern Baptist. I think I can
best express my present relation to that tradition
by telling a quick story. At one point many years
ago, I was in Germany, where a trained ear can
almost always detect what region someone comes
from by the dialect of the German language that
person uses. I make a little hobby of guessing
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where people are from on this basis. But I was
faced one day with someone who said he was
“from Munich” but who didn’t have the
unmistakable Bavarian color to his speech. After
he assured me that he really was born in Munich, I
said, “then you must have unlearned your
language.” His answer was, “I didn’t unlearn it; I
took it to a higher stage of development.”1 The
point of my telling the story is that I’d say the
same thing about my evangelical Protestant
upbringing: I haven’t unlearned it; I’ve taken it to
a higher stage of development. By this I mean,
for example, that I am still Protestant in the sense
that I believe that some members of the Church
hierarchy make claims for their authority over the
faith and practice of other Christians that cannot
be justified by Scripture, tradition, or reason. This
does not make me a Protestant but a Protestant
Catholic (a term that, incidentally, despite its
sounding contradictory to modern ears, can be
accurately applied to Martin Luther himself), a
voice that is both a voice from within and a
critical voice, critical most particularly of injustice
within the Church itself.
One of the injustices of today’s Church is that her
young people are woefully ill-informed about the
Church. One act of justice that we as teachers can
perform is simply to provide these students with
accurate information when such subjects come up.
I have already given the example of the Roman
Catholic student who is certain that “his” Church
does not believe in the resurrection of the body.
That misunderstanding is dangerous enough in
moral terms, since it would entail that, in order to
be a Catholic Christian, one would have to hold a
radical soul/body dualism that would, by
implication, rule out the doctrine of the
Incarnation of God in Christ that is at the core of
Christian teaching. That is a piece of
misinformation that is dangerous in theory, but
probably not that dangerous in practice, since few
people bother to maintain intellectual consistency
and even fewer take the trouble to act according
to such a consistency.
There is, however, another misunderstanding that
I frequently encounter among my Roman Catholic
students that is dangerous and unjust in practice.
This misunderstanding usually comes to light the
first time a student uses the expression “the

Catholic position” in one of my classes. No
matter what the context, I stop the discussion to
question this expression. The student invariably
means to refer to the official Vatican position, for
example, the position on birth control. Taken by
itself, it is a small matter of verbal imprecision.
But when I question students further, a much
more ominous misunderstanding begins to
become apparent. Most of my students—and this
opinion is most widespread among my Roman
Catholic students—believe that there is only one
“Catholic” position on moral questions such as
this, and that a believer who dissents from that
position automatically excommunicates himself or
herself from the Church. These students are
ignorant of the most fundamental facts of dissent
in the Church and are shocked momentarily, but
soon thereafter relieved, in most cases, to learn
that there are any number of bishops,
archbishops, and even entire national colleges of
bishops who dissent from the Vatican position on
birth control. Since many of these students do in
fact dissent from the official position on any
number of points of doctrine or practice, their
ignorance of the fact that there can be dissent
within the Church means that they feel themselves
forced to leave the Church or at best to feel
alienated within it by reason of their self-imposed
silence. Pointing out the fact that there are
persons in high positions of authority within the
Church who dissent from the official Vatican view
of this or that is an act of justice toward the
students, since it allows them to retain those
aspects they can accept of the moral foundation
the Church provides even in the face of times of
doubt or points of disagreement, and it is an act of
justice toward the Church, since it helps the
Church to retain the dissenting voices that serve
as the engine of change that no human institution
can survive without. What this form of justice has
to do with Ignatius will gradually emerge as my
paper develops.
Since the Second Vatican Council, there has been
much discussion in the Church and among the
Jesuits about the preferential option for the poor,
and some have questioned whether the Church,
and the Jesuits in particular, should play as large a
role as they do in educating the wealthy. I do not
mean to cheapen the idea of a preferential option
for the poor but to deepen it when I say that I
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have the experience, more often than it is
comfortable to count, of trying to teach the
intellectually poor, and it is often the children of
the rich whom I find to be the poorest of the
intellectually poor. It is not just that the students
are ill-informed; much worse is their frequent lack
of will to become informed, to read books, to read
newspapers, to watch or listen to television and
radio news and find out what is going on in the
world around them. In my experience, the kid
from Beverly Hills High is less likely to pick up a
newspaper than the kid from South Central Los
Angeles. They are also less likely to be registered
to vote or to know how to vote when election day
comes. This is not just an informational poverty
but an impoverishment of will that I try to address
in my Ethics course in its root causes.
What does cause this impoverishment of will? I
got a lesson in this one day early in my teaching
career when I mentioned the decades-long North
Korean famine in class, noting that the country
would be facing a generation of citizens who are
irretrievably brain-damaged from prolonged
malnutrition. I also pointed out what seemed to
me the logical consequence: that a whole
generation of teachers, scientists, business leaders,
etc., would have to come from abroad while the
government cared for these grown-up children of
famine in institutions. My point was that the
policies of North Korean leaders would result in a
crippling of the country’s economic structure, a
prediction that has sadly, been fulfilled in great
measure. But as I was drawing this consequence,
a visibly angry student shouted at me from the
second row of seats: “Why are you talking about
this? I don’t want to hear about it! It just makes
me sad. It has nothing to do with me, and I can’t
do anything about it!” Of course, I was shocked,
but I did what I could to explain patiently that an
American foreign policy reaching back over
decades had played a role in the famine, that
foreign policy is made and executed primarily by
our President, that citizens of legal majority have
the privilege of voting for Presidents and
congressional representatives, and that it is
possible for a voter to get a pretty clear sense of a
candidate’s foreign policy objectives from media
reports prior to the election. In other words, it
does have something to do with you, and you can
do something about it. If I am not mistaken, that

student began reading the newspaper, and she
started asking questions in class about how her
actions could affect the things she was reading
about.
What was behind this student’s new willingness to
learn was also a change in her self-understanding.
She was not previously accustomed to thinking of
herself as a moral agent, as someone who can
initiate actions that have potentially global
consequences, and who can deliberate rationally
both about the ends or moral principles of such
actions and about the means used to reach those
ends. This change in the students’ selfunderstanding is my primary goal in the Ethics
course. I view this goal as an act of justice
towards the students, a preferential option for the
intellectually poor, if you will. Our students live in
a society that treats them (I should write: all of
us) primarily as consumers of products and
services. This treatment threatens to reduce the
human person to someone who chooses among
preselected options on the basis of liking one of
the options more than the others. And trends of
fashion take away most of even this radically
impoverished latitude for choice; one is only
allowed to like what one is told it is currently
fashionable to like. Even the “nonconformist”
has his or her accepted uniform.
I consider it one of the most urgent imperatives of
justice in education for us not to treat our students
as consumers. Of course, I require them to read
Aristotle, Mill, and Kant, and some combination
of Cicero and Kierkegaard and perhaps Foucault;
and I ask them to know something about these
authors’ positions on moral questions. But these
are tools toward a larger purpose: that of inviting
and training students to think for themselves
about moral questions, to form reasoned opinions
about them and to find ways of putting them into
practice. Too many of our students are quite
willing to form opinions about moral issues but
not reasoned opinions. This stems from their
failure to think of themselves as reasoners. This
failure does not begin with them; it is already
present in the larger society that acts as if it needs
them less as reasoners than as consumers, and it is
perpetuated all too often in an educational sector
that treats students as consumers of information
rather than as agents of moral judgment. (If
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professors are information-delivery devices, the
day is not far off when we will find ourselves
regulated by the intellectual-property equivalent of
the FDA.)
The texts for the Ethics course are fairly
standardized. It is customary in my department to
use Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Kant’s
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and John
Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, but there are variations.
One colleague, for example, relies almost
exclusively on Aristotle; another uses an ethics
textbook that has selections from many authors. I
do use the three customary texts, with any number
of twists of my own. One is that I have the
students read the texts in a reverse chronological
order: reverse because Mill’s utilitarianism is
closer than Kant’s formalism or Aristotelian
virtues ethics to the ethical arguments the students
are already familiar with from the media and the
society around them. It simply makes for more
effective teaching to lead the students from what
is more familiar to them to what is less familiar.
One standard approach I am careful to avoid is
that of presenting Aristotle, Kant, and Mill as if
they were three possible options for moral
evaluation that are mutually exclusive and which
students must choose among. If it is a key
element of justice toward our students to treat
them as rationally deliberative moral agents, then
it is also essential to avoid this trap. The
alternative is to allow each of these authors to
come alive and teach the students the power of his
particular approach to moral reflection. I do not
try to get a student to identify as Aristotelian,
Kantian, or utilitarian; rather, I encourage each
student to find elements of each thinker that he or
she can use in moral deliberation. I will say more
on this point when I come to the term paper
assignment.
I also include Cicero’s De officiis on my reading list
(the Latin title means On Duties). I have any
number of reasons for doing this. One is that,
although my doctoral training and my research has
been chiefly as a specialist on Kant, I think Kant is
far too often cast as a proponent of a radical
modernity that breaks clearly from the classical
tradition of moral reflection. There is good
evidence that Kant had Christian Garve’s German

translation of De officiis before him while writing
the Groundwork, and an attentive listener can hear
many Ciceronian resonances in Kant’s text.
Having the students read Cicero gives them a
chance to eavesdrop on a subtle dialogue between
a modern thinker and an ancient one and to see
that this language of “ancient” and “modern”
conceals as much of continuity as it reveals of
contrast.
It’s true, also, that Mill responds to Kant, although
not in the same way that Kant responds to Cicero.
Kant is a subtle reader of Cicero and, while not
naming him explicitly, responds on quite a deep
level to his thought. Mill does name Kant
explicitly, but Mill’s “Kant” is a caricature that
contains a long list of demonstrably mistaken
interpretations of Kant’s ethics. Mill thus
provides a convenient example of how badly we
often listen to one another in conversations about
ethical principles. Having seen Mill practice this
distorted representation of Kant’s position trains
students to police one another in their group
discussions for just this kind of distortion of one
another’s positions. I will come back briefly to
these group discussions after some additional
remarks on the reading assignments and my
general teaching strategy.
My most fundamental reason for choosing to read
Cicero with the Ethics students is his central
moral category of decorum, sometimes translated as
“propriety”. Other possible English equivalents
might be tact or consistency; the characteristically
German virtue of Konsequenz is almost certainly
derived from Cicero’s decorum. I try to get Cicero’s
ideas across through the sense of fit: decorum has
to do with what fits (or what is appropriate to) a
human being as such, as well as what fits in a
particular person’s life story as a whole and what
fits with his or her present stage of life, position,
resources, etc. I appreciate Cicero’s sensitivity to
the most minute particularities and contingencies
of a person’s life—and, indeed, Cicero is one of
few moral philosophers who can articulate how
something as apparently trivial as the clothes one
wears could be seen as a moral issue--but I have a
deeper reason for bringing him into the moral
conversation. Decorum cannot be judged by reason
and can therefore not be argued about. It relies
on a sensibility that bridges the moral to the
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aesthetic and helps to make the case for the
importance of imagination in moral life. Cicero
teaches students to respect their most deeply-felt
intuitions about moral appropriateness, even when
those intuitions are not verbally articulated or, in
some cases, articulable. Cicero also helps in this
way to avoid the pitfall of believing that since
reason can clarify some elements (viz., the rational
elements) of moral decision-making, it can actually
make moral decisions. I emphasize to students
from Day One of the course that there is no
moral decision that we can make on the basis of
reason alone, without the help of imagination,
judgment, and ultimately of faith. What moral
philosophy can do is to help avoid certain
mistakes in our moral reasoning; it cannot replace
the nonrational parts of the ethical decision. At
the same time, the greater danger here is not that
the students will become ethical rationalists but that
they will revert to an ethical irrationalism. This
happens when ethics teachers make exaggerated
claims for the power of reason to solve moral
problems, and then students become disillusioned
with reason itself when these claims prove to be
empty. Curbing students’ expectations of moral
philosophy is thus an essential element of justice
toward them, since it helps them to preserve and
value their rational capacities while not giving
them exclusive pride of place in the human
person.
I’ll make just two more comments about reading
assignments. I admitted already that I am a Kant
specialist by training, and, as you might expect, I
do spend an unusually large chunk of time on
Kant in my Ethics course. This is not, however,
because I think Kant represents the pinnacle of
moral philosophy. I would much sooner say that
Aristotle represents such a pinnacle, so that my
reverse chronological order allows me to end the
course with the richest and most nuanced moral
treatise I know: the Nicomachean Ethics. No, the
comprehensiveness of my use of Kant in this
course (indeed, he sneaks somehow into every
course I teach) stems from my desire to offer the
students the best that I have, the best example that
I can give of a careful, well-informed reading of a
philosopher, without the claim that it is the best
there is. In fact, my knowledge of Kant and my
sympathy with Aristotle make me probably most
well-disposed toward thinkers like Maréchal and

Lonergan who, as I understand it, attempt to
converse with Kant from their base in the
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. The very
existence of Maréchal and Lonergan as authors
within the Catholic intellectual tradition falsifies
the unjust claim that one must choose between
Catholic moral thought and the “modernity”
represented by Kant, with no possibility of
thoughtful mediation.
Recognizing such false dichotomies is naturally a
part of any Ethics course. As I’ve said already, I
make it a goal to incorporate contemporary moral
problems at every turn. One that always comes
up (because I cannot remain silent about it) is the
death penalty. When I poll students, the
overwhelming majority of them believe the press
hype that tells them that the majority of
Americans favor the death penalty. (I read the
same hype in German papers, and when I do, the
author and editor get a sharply-worded letter from
me. One of those letters even elicited a response.)
When the issue comes up, we take a close look at
the wording of the pollsters’ questions. One such
poll question (typical, so far as I know) runs
something like this: Do you think a serial killer
and rapist should (a) be executed, or (b) go free?
It is no surprise that most Americans (more than
70%, as I remember) choose execution when
offered this false dichotomy. At least one
alternative polling agency found that all it took for
the pro-death penalty responses to drop well
below fifty percent was to offer pollees the third
alternative of life imprisonment. Laws are made
as a result of which lives—sometimes innocent
lives—are lost on the basis of a misplaced respect
for statistics, when a careful scrutiny of the way
poll questions are posed could lead to a more just
result. The injustice in this case is multiple. Of
course, the greatest injustice is that innocent lives
are lost. But there is the additional injustice of
pollsters and the media not just reporting public
opinion but distorting and manipulating it. And
the very claim that the majority of American
citizens favor the death penalty is unjust to that
very majority who record such an opinion only
when offered a false dichotomy. I try with
examples like this to encourage students to grasp
that if they want to play some role in enacting
justice in the world, they don’t just need the
“right” moral theory (or, God forbid, the
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arrogance that comes with that expression, “the
moral high ground”). They need to read the
newspapers and to do so critically, which probably
means knowing something not just about
journalism but about history and inferential
statistics as well.
I use the early sessions of the Ethics course to lay
out a set of concrete examples, both to get
students to see the need for moral philosophy and
to get them to explore initially their own sense of
what is morally right and wrong. I choose
examples that are close to the students’ everyday
lives but which, at the same time, demonstrate
something of the complexity of moral
deliberation. One example I frequently use is the
decision whether to give money to a street beggar.
Of course, the students give a variety of
responses. Then ask I ask them to identify factors
that might affect their decision: What if the
person appears drunk, has a small child, or
appears too well-off to be begging? Then I ask
what principle the students have used to make their
decision. Most are not aware of having used a
principle at all; they felt their way through the
problem holistically. In itself, this does not appear
problematic, especially if the response was
charitable or compassionate. But it is, in fact,
tragic if the holistic, emotive approach to the
problem makes it impossible to articulate any
principles at all—tragic, because if we cannot
speak about moral problems, we cannot learn
from one another’s experiences, insights, and
deliberations. This is the state of splendid and
depressing moral isolation that most of our
students find themselves in upon entering an
Ethics course. And this isolation becomes
untenable precisely at the point where the student
discovers a moral problem he or she does not
have the resources to settle alone and does not
have the language to carry on a moral discourse
with others about in which their perspectives
could be added to his or her own, or, in the
extreme case, to interact with the student’s own
views in such a way as to alter them. Helping
students to articulate moral principles, however
clumsily at first, is a matter of justice, since it is
only in this way that the human moral
conversation becomes open to them, and it is only
in this way that their voices become available to
the larger human moral conversation.

After we stumble over the problem of moral
principles, I take the students through an exercise
that helps them begin to articulate principles. I
ask them to imagine all of the possible different
responses to the beggar’s request. They had at
first thought only in terms of the false dichotomy,
to give or not to give cash. On my prodding,
students begin to propose other possibilities: to
give food, to engage in a friendly conversation,
etc. But I am usually the one who has to come up
with the more outlandish options: shouting
obscenities at the beggar or even engaging in
physical violence. Students want to insist at first
that these are impossible, I suppose partly on the
basis of the expression heard all too frequently,
“That’s not an option.” Never mind the fact that
what most often follows this expression is a
“because,” which tells us why this particular
option has already been ruled out. My point is
that it is often these perfectly outrageous
alternatives for action that turn out to be the most
helpful in articulating our moral principles. If we
can say why it is that we are so certain that
inflicting blows on a person who asks us for help
is wrong, we may then have found the very
principle we need to decide among the not-sooutrageous alternatives. For example, if we say
that it is a matter of human dignity, that it is, after
all, an interaction between one human being and
another, then this may help us see that, for
example, throwing some coins on the ground for
the beggar is less consistent with human dignity
than saying “Good morning” but giving nothing.
I do not mean this as a solution of the problem,
only as an example of how we discover and
articulate principles. The purpose is to induce a
process of moral reflection, not to determine the
outcome of the process. Apart from this basic
purpose, the exercise also cultivates the students’
imagination for alternatives, in keeping with my
conviction that it is a serious moral problem not
to be able to imagine that there even could be a
response different from the one I and those
around me typically give. I try to impress upon
students that there is a moral advantage to
learning a foreign language or experiencing a
foreign culture on its own turf: these actions help
us to imagine that it is possible to live otherwise.
And I, at least, find concrete examples of this
among my own students: bilingual and bicultural
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students display, in my observation, a higher
degree of moral imagination precisely because
they think and live in two cultures at once. It is
probably as difficult for these students to imagine
that there are those who think there’s only one
way of saying or doing something as it is for our
monolingual, monocultural students to imagine
alternate ways of living and speaking.
My favorite story of such a lack of imagination
comes from the first few years of my teaching
while still a graduate student at Emory University
in Atlanta. One of my sharpest students engaged
me in conversation one day to ask me about my
personal goals. He was puzzled, because he
thought that I was of at least above-average
intelligence, and he couldn’t understand why I
would go into a career with as little financial
promise as university teaching. “Dr. Wilson,” he
asked, “don’t you have any goals?” When I
answered, “Sure, I have goals, just not financial
ones,” he countered, “I’m not aware that there are
any non-financial goals.” Of course, the truth was
that he was not aware—I wish I could write “not
yet aware”, but I do not know this—of the nonfinancial goals he carries in his own heart.
Leading students toward insight into their own
most heartfelt goals is much more of an art than a
science, and I am convinced that it has a great deal
in common with spiritual direction as manifest in
the Spiritual Exercises. I will devote the final pages
of my paper to a brief exploration of these
affinities (I am sure you have guessed some of
them already), but before I do so, I want to
remark briefly on the three main tools I use in the
course in the attempt to produce these insights.
First, there is the daily format of the class on
Mondays and Wednesdays. I do not formally
lecture in this course except when reviewing for
an exam. One reason for this is simply that I was
not taught by lecture but by discussion from
freshman year forward. (I did my undergraduate
work at St. John’s, Annapolis, the so-called Great
Books school.) I had never even observed the
lecture format until graduate school, when I was
teaching assistant for several professors who
taught in this way. What I saw then was very
instructive—and discouraging. It was typical for
the professor to come in and summarize the

simplest parts of the text that anyone who had
actually read it would already have understood, to
remain silent about the difficult passages, and to
discourage questions in order to “get on with the
material”. This had two disastrous effects: it
actually discouraged students from reading, and
when the time came for a planned discussion day,
the students had so clearly heard the message that
their voices were unwelcome that they remained
silent, and the professor was left frustrated and
angry, not understanding that the students were
simply doing what he or she had trained them to
do. Lecturing is often touted as an efficient
means of communicating information, but in the
cases I saw, at least, it was the least efficient means
of learning, especially in philosophy, where we are
not primarily in the business of communicating
information but of teaching skills (for lack of a
better term) of thought and insight.
I have never found the perfect remedy for this
problem. The one thing I do consistently, day
after day, is to find out from the students how
much they have been able to understand of the
text already and where they’ve encountered
difficulties, so that I can concentrate my work on
those aspects of the text they have not been able
to grasp on their own. My mechanism for doing
this is to assign a student or a small group of
students to come prepared to present, in five to
ten minutes, the text for the day, and this
presentation begins our discussion. This makes
our work much more efficient, since even if the
presenter has badly misunderstood the text, this
shows me that someone in his or her position can
misunderstand the text in just this way, and I can
direct my interventions toward just this
misunderstanding. I do not worry a great deal
about “covering” material; I would point out, with
an experienced translator’s sensitivity to language,
that it is not our job to cover material but to
uncover it for the students or, better, to teach them
to uncover it for themselves. These metaphors do
mean something, whether we use them
deliberately or not. Even the more standard
signification of “covering” in this context—that of
covering ground or territory—is disastrous, since
it implies putting land or road or what have you
behind us, and what we want in the classroom is to
make certain questions and possible answers
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present before our students and to keep them
present.
And I have a deeper agenda behind assigning
these presentations which, incidentally, I use with
both my freshmen and upper-division majors..
They force the students, at least a few times
during the semester, to encounter the difficult
primary texts we read on their own. This is a
traumatic experience for many of them, since they
are convinced that they cannot make any sense
out of Aristotle or Kant without help. One of my
central goals is to show them, first, that they do
have some resources of their own for reading and
understanding such texts, then, to use the class
discussions to refine the tools they already
possess. If this is the goal, it is crucial for me not
to summarize the texts for them, since this
perpetuates the idea that I am the producer of
knowledge and they are the consumers, which
would leave them in precisely the state of
dependence I want to lead them out of in order to
read and think for themselves. This agenda means
that I do not have to exercise much discipline to
keep up the pace of the discussion and keep us
moving from one point to another so that we are
sure to “finish”. Instead, my discipline consists of
making certain that our discussions are always
substantial and relevant, but once that condition is
met, I can let them be as fragmentary or slow as
they need to be. However, the next class period,
we always move on to the next reading
assignment. I might allow myself five minutes of
remarks as transition. We are always on schedule.
The main reason I insist on this is that the
students’ participation is crucial to the course. In
order to participate, they must be prepared, and in
order to prepare, they must know exactly what to
expect on a particular day, preferably well in
advance. These Monday and Wednesday classes
prepare students for an essay midterm and final,
when I ask them to discuss the texts in a
substantial and relevant way, but without any
demand for completeness. The one proviso is
that they must be able to write about each of the
texts in a way that indicates they’ve not derived
their understanding of it solely from our
discussions, which means they actually have to do
the readings.

Fridays I reserve for small group discussions. The
overall purpose is to prepare students to write
their final papers applying ethical theories to the
solution of a concrete moral decision of their
choice. Early in the semester, I assign a decision
for groups to consider; later, individual students
introduce their chosen paper topics for discussion
by the group. The main benefit of the small
group discussions is that the students learn to
carry on a rational debate with persons whose
moral positions differ from their own. Any claim
is allowed, even if it is offensive to someone else
in the group; I allow no one to be silenced. The
provision I make is that anyone who makes a
moral claim must be willing to defend it with
reasons and willing to consider, on the basis of
reasons offered by others, altering his or her view.
Many students believe they cannot converse with
persons whose views they consider offensive;
some believe that this is not possible at all—like
the black students who begged me at the
beginning of one Ethics section please to avoid
discussions of racism, because they thought no
good could possibly come of such conversations.
But by the midpoint of every term, the small
groups are managing to have the very discussions
they initially thought were too dangerous or even
impossible.
There is a question of justice here as well. The
male student, for example, who began his group
participation by articulating views about women
that were offensive to almost everyone present
had not thought through these views for himself.
He had heard them from someone in his family or
social group. His only opportunity to revise his
views, which he slowly began to do, was to be
made a part of a discussion in which he was
allowed to begin by voicing these offensive views.
It was an act of justice toward him not to deprive
him of this opportunity. The other members of
the group (the overwhelming majority, in fact)
who were offended by his initial remarks were not,
I would argue, injured by them. Instead, they
learned that silencing the offending party is not as
powerful as calling him or her to account for the
views with reasons everyone can understand. The
“political correctness” that responds to offensive
speech by excluding the offenders from the moral
conversation only makes the views more extreme.
It is the equivalent of locking up those who

Jesuit Higher Education 2(1): 99-111 (2013)

107

Wilson: Teaching with Ignatius
commit petty crimes and offering no
opportunities for education or reform: we should
not be surprised when the result is a hardened
criminal or a confirmed bigot, misogynist, etc.,
who is then invulnerable to better influences.
From the other side, the gay or lesbian student,
for example, who has seen the possibility of
influencing a homophobic classmate toward a
different view through open and rational
discussion leaves the course with a new reserve of
hope, whatever the initial sting of having to hear
the offensive remarks. I would argue that it is
unjust to deprive him or her of this hope through
an exaggerated protective solicitude.
I have students write two preliminary drafts of
their final papers. I review and comment on one
of the drafts; another is critiqued by a fellow
student. The process of critique and revision
offers multiple opportunities for insight. For
example, when critiquing a classmate’s paper, a
student often realizes for the first time why
professors write the comments they do on his or
her own papers, and students often find
themselves following the advice they themselves
have given in their critique as a way of improving
their own work. But the insights are not always
just academic. One student chose as her moral
decision what career she should pursue. Her
parents wanted her to be a physician; her talents
were artistic, but she thought that pursuing these
talents would be selfish. I wrote very brief
comments on her draft, pointing out that while
doctors certainly save lives, it is rash to assume
that artists do not. That led to a conversation
where I shared our University Physician’s insight
with her that many people die not of physical
causes but of spiritual ones, such as the person
with AIDS who skips his medications because he’s
depressed. One way of describing artists, I think,
is as doctors who deal in the spiritual causes of
disease, those causes that tap into soul and
imagination and those sources of life that will
always remain mysterious to medical science.
Well, the student dropped out of pre-med studies
to major in art, and one short comment on one
paper draft was instrumental to her decision. It is
a matter of justice to lead our students to the
insight that their own gifts have an intrinsic worth
that does not depend on any comparative

evaluation with careers and talents that someone
regards as objectively more valuable.
As a final remark before turning to the Ignatian
resonances, I want to comment on the very idea
of Ethics as an upper-division core requirement.
One of my first interactions with the students in
these classes occurs when I ask them whether it
irritates them to have their specialized work in
their major interrupted by such a requirement.
Many are willing to say that it does, especially if I
allow them to think for a moment that I might
sympathize with their irritation. Then I explain to
them why we interrupt them in this way: after they
have already begun to actualize themselves as
potential bankers, doctors, lawyers, business
leaders, artists, engineers, filmmakers, we call them
back and address them again as human persons, to
remind them that they are not their work, that it is
only out of the core of themselves as whole
persons that they can accomplish worthwhile
work. In a society where it seems that what you
“do for a living”—and therefore what quality and
quantity of commercial goods and services you are
able to consume—defines who you are, it is a
crucial act of justice to treat our students with an
eye to their intrinsic worth as persons and to teach
them to be attentive to this non-commercial
worth in themselves and others and in the world
around them.
In The First Jesuits, John O’Malley quotes Ignatius’
secretary, Juan Alfonso de Polanco, as saying that
the director of the Spiritual Exercises should not be
too directive, because “individuals will more
deeply relish what they discover for themselves.”2
As you have surely already grasped, this is a
principle I use in the Ethics course as well; the
main point is to induce and empower the students
to discover in classic texts as well as in themselves
principles of moral deliberation. O’Malley also
notes that Jesuit education has sought from the
beginning “to move the student beyond pious
practices to an inner appropriation of ethical and
religious values.3 I do my best to construct the
course in such a way as to foster this inner
appropriation as my primary goal.
David Lonsdale notes that Ignatius’ autobiography
makes clear that “experience was the main catalyst
of change in his life”4 and that spiritual
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discernment was always based for him on
reflection on his own experience. This reflection
would always contain for him consolations and
desolations, attractions and revulsions. A good
Ethics instructor, like a good spiritual director,
first lets the students know that these inner
movements are a normal, expected, and salutary
part of the process of reflection, and then
monitors the students’ states of mind as they
progress. One of the reasons I have hesitated to
become involved in online teaching is that I feel a
need to be physically in the same room with my
students, see how they sit, how they make or
avoid eye contact, how they interact with others,
etc., in order to be attentive to the moments when
my intervention becomes imperative. Usually it is
a matter of waiting for a student who has become
troubled by the process of reflection to come to
me, but by the time this happens, I am seldom
surprised by the fact that the student is troubled
or even by the nature of the disturbance, since I
am a careful reader of the non-verbal language my
students speak. I imagine that I would encounter
similar difficulties in giving an Ethics course over
the Internet as an Ignatian priest or religious
would encounter when giving the Spiritual Exercises
in this way. Even if there is a live video link, is the
color transmission sensitive enough to show me
how a student’s face pales in a discussion when a
classmate asks an uncomfortable question? These
questions do not speak against teaching or
offering spiritual direction online; they merely
represent special challenges to be overcome.
Technology such as social media may offer
important advantages over traditional forms of
communication in the ways that they incorporate
visual media more intensively, make possible
immediate responses to immediate problems, and
automatically keep a visible record of changes
over time.
Ignatius’ concern to adapt the Spiritual Exercises
“to the temperament and talent of his listeners”5
presupposes that he must have been attentive to
the differences in talent and temperament among
his listeners. My approach of basing any lecturing
I do on questions and confusions in student
presentations reflects this same attentiveness.
This, too, is a question of justice, since giving
equal access to education does not simply mean
allowing students of all backgrounds to be

physically present in our classrooms. It must also
mean becoming aware of who our students are
and matching examples, metaphors, study
questions, and all sorts of teaching techniques to
the students we have rather than to some ideal
student we (probably misguidedly) wish that we
had.
This attentiveness to who our students actually are
is a first step toward drawing them into the life of
a community. The fact that Ignatius and the
Spiritual Exercises have given rise to the fraternal
community of the Society of Jesus as well as, less
directly, to several women’s orders6 points to a
connection between spiritual direction and
community. The relevant community in the case
of the Ethics course is the community of moral
discourse, where each of us is not left solely to his
or her own meager resources of experience and
reflection to make moral decisions. Instead,
conversation about moral issues makes it possible
to leave this isolation, to borrow experiences and
tools of reflection from others, and yet to preserve
the identity of one’s inwardness.7
The emphasis Ignatius places on imagination in
the Exercises generates another suggestion: that
the arts, as cultivators of imagination, have a
leading role to play in moral development. I am
always pleased to have fine arts or film or theater
or music majors in the Ethics class. They are at
times less apt (or less patient, anyway) with the
theoretical aspects of the course, but they are
trained in an attentiveness to the contingencies of
life, contingencies that make for a subtle
differentiation in the way moral principles are
applied from one nearly identical case to the next.
Anyone who has tuned a guitar or spoken a line of
Shakespeare or edited three minutes of video is
immediately more open to recognizing the
significance of small differences.
Ignatius writes in his Reminiscences that he made the
decision to go to Barcelona for the purpose of
“studying for a time in order to be able to help
souls.”8 I have puzzled for about a year now over
the question, What does it mean to study in order
to be helpful to souls? I’ve also put the question
to several Jesuits; neither they nor I have an
answer that satisfies me. Of course, the theme of
service to others that plays a role in every Jesuit
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university’s mission statement is relevant here.
But what sort of intellectual training promotes our
ability to be of service to others? The only reply I
have at my ready disposal today is that a good
Ethics course raises this question, even for the
business majors, who may think that their only
goals are financial ones, then find themselves
puzzled when their management professors, for
example, talk to them about cultivating
relationships and about the need for every
community (including a company) to foster the
wholeness of the persons who make it up.
In the Spiritual Exercises themselves, I find one
resonance in the Second Annotation to my way of
teaching, which demands that the students
struggle on their own with difficult material, even
when I could make it much easier, so that they will
have the experience and satisfaction of
discovering their ability to read difficult books and
think difficult thoughts. The Second Annotation
enjoins the director to be “brief and summary”
and to leave as much as possible to self-discovery
and divine grace. The reason: “For it is not so
much knowledge that fills and satisfies the soul,
but rather the intimate feeling and relishing of
things.”9 A simple method of lecturing threatens
to deprive students unjustly of their “intimate
feeling and relishing” of their own capacity for
learning and moral reflection.
In the “Presupposition” to the First Week,
Ignatius has one of the clearest articulations I’ve
found of the principle of charitable interpretation:
“...any good Christian has to be more ready to
justify than to condemn a neighbor’s statement. If
no justification can be found, one should ask the
neighbor in what sense it should be taken, and if
that sense is wrong he or she should be corrected
lovingly.”10 The relevant “neighbors” for the
Ethics course are the authors of the assigned
readings as well as one’s fellow students. A
charitable reading in the former case is necessary
in order for the students to get as much worth out
of these authors as possible for their own moral
reflection. In the latter case, it is necessary
because of the truth that we teachers seldom
admit willingly: the students learn more from one
another than they do from us. Reserving Fridays
for small group discussions is one way I
acknowledge this truth; I do this in order to try, as

far as possible, to place this mutual learning at the
center of the students’ institutionalized education.
There is also a question of justice at play here,
combined with a type of humility that does not
come easily to any teacher. The ability to learn
from one another in moral conversation is a skill
that can tremendously enrich our students’ later
lives. The skill of attentive listening and notetaking to lectures on ethics is one that is not likely
to be called for again once they graduate.
In closing, and with apologies for my somewhat
fragmentary treatment of Ignatian spirituality, I
want to sound just a few notes from Justice in the
World, the document of the 1971 Synod of
Bishops that has proven so influential in
articulating the Church’s renewed commitment to
justice. The bishops declare that “education
demands a renewal of heart.... It will likewise
awaken a critical sense.”11 I suppose the renewal
of heart I try to produce in students has to do
with rekindling in them a childlike faith in their
own core intuitions and talents, like the young
woman who learned to trust her call to become an
artist. On the side of awakening a critical sense,
the bishops also remark that “contemporary
consciousness demands truth in the
communications systems, including the right to
the image offered by the media and the
opportunity to correct its manipulation.”12 I make
something of a campaign out of reminding
students what it means to live in a society with
free access to information, in contrast to any
number of dictatorships where, for example,
publishing an underground newspaper will end
you up in prison, where, if you are unlucky
enough to arrive healthy, you may have vital
organs removed and sold on the black market. At
the same time, you will remember that in the case
of the death penalty opinion polls, I teach
students to approach the media with a critical eye
and to question the question. Thus, the bishops
note that a just education “will help them to be no
longer the object of manipulation by
communications media or political forces.”13
Forty years later, Justice in the World resonates in
concrete forms, such as the Africa Faith & Justice
Network, which was formed in 1983 in direct
response to the bishops’ document. Their
executive director, Fr. Rocco Puopolo, notes that
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the document “brought the Church’s social
ministry from the ‘fringe’ … to the very center of
what it means to be Christian as part of the
renewal of Vatican II.” I would add to this
thought the idea that Catholic higher education,
especially in its Ignatian expression, has become—
and should continue to become—understood in
terms of the social ministry of the Church as itself
a constellation of acts of justice.
I will take just one final quotation from Justice in
the World: “The Church recognizes everyone’s
right to suitable freedom of expression and
thought. This includes the right of everyone to be
heard in a spirit of dialogue which preserves a
legitimate diversity within the Church.”14 I
sincerely hope in my teaching, in my academic
leadership work, and in this essay to be
contributing something to this same spirit of
dialogue.
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